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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----0000000----

DIVERSIFIED GENERAL CORPORATION, )
)
a Utah Corporation,
)

Plaintiff and Appellant, )

District Court No. 67122

)

vs.

)
)

WHITE BARN GOLF COURSE, INC. , a
)
Utah Corporation, KEITH B. DOWNS,)
ALBERT SANONE, A OK LANDS INCOR- )
PORATED, a Utah Corporation, and )
JOHN DOES 1 Through 8 inclusive, )

Supreme Court No. 15462

)

Defendants and Respondents.)

Appeal from Summary Judgment of the Second District Court for
Weber County, State of Utah
THE HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE,
Presiding

For the Plaintiff-Appellant
PARSONS &
Attorneys
310 South
Salt Lake

CROWTHER
at Law
Main Street, Suite 310
City, Utah 84101

For the Defendants-Respondents
PATTERSON, PHILLIPS, GRIDLEY & ECHARD
Attorneys at Law
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

DIVERSIFIED GENERAL CORPORATION, )
)
a Utah Corporation,
)

Plaintiff and Appellant, )
)

vs.

)

CASE No. 15462

)

WHITE BAR.N GOLF COURSE, INC. , a
)
Utah Corporation, KEITH B. DOWNS,)
ALBERT SANONE, A OK LANDS INCOR- )
PORATED, a Utah Corporation, and )
JOHN DOES, 1 Through 8 inclusive.)
)

Defendants and Respondents.)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff, Diversified General Corporation ("DGC"), brought
this action to recover the balance of a "finder's" fee to which
it deems itself entitled by the terms and provisions of a
written and subsequent oral agreement with Defendant White Barn
Golf Course, Inc.

("White Barn"), for having found a purchaser

for certain real property owned and offered for sale by White
Barn.
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DISPOSITION IN LO\\TER COURT
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which
was subsequently argued to and heard by the court.

Summary

judgment was awarded in favor of Defendants on the grounds
that one who undertakes for a fee to secure a purchaser for
property belonging to another comes within the purview of
the Real Estate Broker's Statute, 7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-1
et seq.

(1953), which precludes an action for recovery of

compensation by one not licensed as a real estate broker or
salesman.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
DGC seeks an order reversing the decision of the lower
court and setting aside summary judgment.
FACTS
On January 6, 1976, a "Finder's Agreement"

("Agreement")

was executed between DGC and White Barn, whereby DGC was
given the right to find a buyer for White Barn's golf course
and condominium development.

In the event that DGC were

able to find a buyer and the sale were

consumm~ted,

White

Barn agreed to pay to DGC 13-1/3% of the sales price and
convey a condominium to DGC.

The Agreement specifically

stated that no services other than those of a finder were
be rendered by DGC (Record at 7-8).

Subsequent to the Agree-

ment, DGC found a potential Buyer and introduced him to a
White Barn representative.

~

DGC did not participate in the
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ensuing sales negotiations, nor in the preparation of sales
documents and was not present at the closing (Record at 32) .
Prior to the closing, however, DGC and White Barn orally
agreed that DGC would not receive the condominium unit and
would receive as its fee the amount of $150,000.00, only.
After the closing DGC agreed to the payment of its fee
in installments, with a down payment of $35,000.00, which
dmvn payment was paid and received by DGC (Record at 3).
However, White Barn failed to pay the balance of the fee,
and on March 28, 1977, DGC filed a complaint to recover the
balance of $115,000.00.

On June 9, 1977, the Defendants moved

the lower court for summary judgment on the grounds that DGC's
activities in finding a buyer were those of a real estate
broker or salesman, that DGC was not a licensed broker or salesman, and therefore, could not lawfully recover a finder's fee
(Record at 28-30).
on June 21, 1977.

The motion was argued before the lower court
On August 30, 1977, the court, by memorandum

decision (Record at 39-41) granted the motion for summary judgment, and summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendants
on September 26, 1977 (Record at 48).

Plaintiff thereafter

filed this appeal on October 6, 1977.

ARGUMENT
The issue raised by this appeal, and narrowly drawn by
the lower court's memorandum decision is simply whether the

-3-
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real estate broker's statutes should apply to one who merely
introduces a potential buyer to an owner and seller of real
property.

POINT I
UTAH CASE LAW DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN A
REAL ESTATE BROKER OR SALESMAN AND A
FINDER AND ESTABLISHES THAT THE MERE
INTRODUCTION OF A POTENTIAL BUYER TO
A SELLER OF REAL PROPERTY DOES NOT OFFEND THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND NOR VIOLATE THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S STATUTES.
The pertinent parts of the applicable s ta +-ntes which
Defendant claim require a finder to be licensed and wlLLch
prohibit an action to recover compensation by one not so
licensed are as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, copartr,.ership or corporation to engage in the businc~s,
act in the capacity of, advertise or assume to
act as a real estate broker or a real estate
salesman within this state without first obtaining a license under the provisions of this chapter.
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-1

(1953).

The term "real estate broker" within the meaning
of this chapter shall include all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations, foreign
and domestic, who for another and for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, or who
in the expectation or upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee, commission or other

-4-
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valuable consideration,
assists or directs
in the procuring of prospects or the negotiations
or closing of any transaction which does or is
calculated to result in the sale, exchange, leasing or renting of any real estate.
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-2 (1953).
(a)
No person, partnership, association or corporation shall bring or maintain an action in any
court of this state for the recovery of commission,
a fee, or compensation for any act done or service
rendered the doing or rendering of which is prohibited under the provisions of this act to other
than licensed real estate brokers, unless such person was duly licensed hereunder as a real estate
broker at the time of the doing of such act or the
rendering of such service.
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-18 (1953).
A.

Andersen v. Johnson.
There are principally two Utah cases dealing with

and resolving the issue raised by this appeal.

The first

chronologically is Andersen v. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160
P.2d 725

(1945), in which the plaintiff entered into an

oral agreement with defendant by which plaintiff obligated
himself to assist defendant, who was a licensed real
estate broker, in securing listings of real estate for sale
by defendant.

In consideration of plaintiff's services,

defendant promised to give to plaintiff a full. one-third
portion of the commission earned by defendant as a result of
any such listing and sale.

Plaintiff was himself not licensed

as a real estate broker or salesman.

Plaintiff subsequently
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introduced defendant to the owner of certain real pro~~
and defendant was thereby enabled to list and sell said
property, earning a conunission which, however, he refused
to share with plaintiff as required by their agreement.
Plaintiff brought an action to recover his portion of
the commission and defendant responded with a demurrer.
The substance of the demurrer was that plaintiff, by
assisting defendant to procure listings, had acted and
should be classified as a real estate broker in accordance with the then statutory definition of the same,
set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. §82-2-2 (1943)

[now UTAH CODE

ANN. §61-2-2 (1953)], which reads in pertinent part as
follows:
The term "real estate broker" within the meaning of this chapter shall include all persons . .
who with the intention or in the expectation or
upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee,
commission, or other valuable consideration . . .
assists or directs in the procuring of prospects
. calculated to result in the sale . . . of
any real estate.
(emphasis added)
The district court agreed with defendant's proposition that plaintiff's assistance in securing listings
made plaintiff a real estate broker, and since plaintiff
was not licensed as such, he could not recover any portion
of defendant's commission.
The supreme court, obviously uneasy about nullifying
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an otherwise valid and bona fide agreement, reversed and
remanded on the grounds that the term "prospects" as used
in UTAH CODE ANN. §82-2-2 (1943), supra, referred only to
those interested in purchasing realty and not to those
wishing to sell:
While it is necessary to secure listings, the
term "real estate prospect" refers to one interested
in the purchase of realty . . . and does not refer
to one from whom you might secure a listing.
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 729.
Justice Wade, in recognition of the awkwardness of
the majority's dictum definition of "prospects" as potential purchasers but not sellers of realty, concurred in
the result

but offered more tenable and non-discriminatory

reasoning for it:
I cannot agree that the phrase 'assists or directs
in the procuring of prospects' in Sec. 82-2-2, U.C.A.
1943, defining 'Real Estate Broker' is limited to
'one interested in the purchase of realty or in obtaining a lease of its use and does not refer to
one from whom you might secure a listing' as stated
in the prevailing opinion.
I think the word 'prospect' includes the prospective seller of property
as well as the prospective buyer.
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 729 (Wade, J. concurring)
Justice Wade then furnished a public policy basis for
excluding appellant from the coverage of UTAH CODE ANN.
§82-2-2 (1943), supra:

-7-
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Whereas a literal reading of Sec. 82-2-2 would
include anyone not specifically exempted therein
who, for compensation, was in any manner connect~d
with a transaction involving real estate, as for
instance a stenographer in a real estate broker's
office who contacted people desiring a listing,
I am of the opinion that such is not the intent or
meaning of this section. A reading of the statutes
regulating real estate brokers makes it apparent
they were enacted for the benefit of the public to
protect them from dishonest and unscrupulous real
estate agents.
Such protection of the public is
not needed from the casual or remote influence of
a stenographer or of a person who may wish to deal
with him.
Neither the stenographer nor the man who
introduces the broker in the examples I have mentioned are active participants in any contract affecting real estate or any liability of the persons
entering into such contracts or listings. The
dealings which the statutes aim to protect tFie public in are those which result in legal liabilities
between the parties.
Nothing the stenographer or
the man who introduces the real estate broker does,
has that effect. This is true even though the real
estate broker contracts to pay the man who introduces
him a part of his commission in the event he makes a
sale.
(emphasis added)
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 729-30 (Wade, J. concurring).
Justice Wade's resolution of the difficulty is superic
to that of the majority in that it does away with the
meaningless distinction between potential buyers and
sellers,

provides a more real is tic and rational public

policy basis for sustaining an agreement like the one ~
Andersen and avoids the harsh results and strained reas~
ing which frequently follow the bad law of hard cases.
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B.

Chase v. Morgan.
In Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019

(1959), the second of the two principal Utah cases, the
supreme court again confronted the real estate broker's
statutes and this time the issue was whether appellant,
who had supplied respondent with prospective purchasers
for its oil and gas leases, was precluded by the statutes
from recovering his agreed-upon compensation.
Justice Wade, this time writing the majority opinion, coneluded that the appellant had violated the statutes

beca~se

agreement with respondent involved more than the mere
introduction of a buyer; it authorized appellant to make
the sales himself:
It is clear from the above evidence that
appellant and his associates were authorized
to sell or negotiate the sale of the leases
involved.
Such an agreement contemplated more
than the mere finding or introduction of a
buyer and clearly was the sort of activity embraced within the definition of "Real estate
broker" quoted above.
(Emphasis added).
Chase v. Morgan, supra, at 1021.
Consistent with his concurring opinion in Andersen,
Justice Wade implies clearly in Chase that the mere finding
or introduction of a buyer or seller is not enough to make
one a broker because public policy does not require it.
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his

His reason for holding that appellant in Chase had viola:
the statutes was that appellant had been more than

a fin

i.e., he was authorized to go beyond mere finding and i~
traducing and actually sell or negotiate the sale of
respondent's leases.

Clearly, such sales or negotiation',

unlike a mere finding or introducing, would give rise~
legal liabilities, and public policy would therefore mandate that appellant and other similarly situated be
licensed and regula tecl for the protection of their pr incipals, and those dealing with them.

To again quote

Justice Wade:
The dealings which the statutes aim to
protect the public in are those which result in legal liabilities between the
parties.
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 730.
As found and stated by the lower court in its memorandM
decision, the case at bar involves the mere contacting and
introducing of a potential buyer and nothing more (Record at
39) •

Indeed, the written agreement executed by appellant

a~

respondent in the case at bar specified that no other services than those of a "finder" were to be rendered by appellac~
(Record at 8), which makes the case at bar quite distinguis~
able from Chase.
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A consideration of its facts shows the case at bar to be
very similar to Andersen, the only pertinent distinction being
that in Andersen appellant introduced a prospective seller
and in the case at bar appellant introduced a buyer.

In neither

case did appellant presume to sell or negotiate a sale without
a broker's license, in neither case did appellant agree or
receive authorization to sell or negotiate a sale, and it
should follow that in neither case will appellant be denied
recovery of compensation bargained for and earned.

POINT II
UTAH LAW AS HERETOFORE DISCUSSED IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF CALIFORNIA WHICH HAS
LONG DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN REAL ESTATE
BROKERS OR SALESMEN AND FINDERS.
California courts have long recognized the important
distinction between real estate brokers or salesmen and finders
and have, accordingly, excluded finders from the coverage of
the California statutes defining real estate brokers, even
though such statutes define brokers to include those who
solicit for prospective purchasers.

Tyrone v. Kelley, 106

Cal. Rptr. 761, 507 P.2d 65, at 70 n.5 (1973).
The court in Tyrone speaks very cogently about the distinction between brokers and finders and the policy reasons
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for recognizing it:
Defendants urge that Tyrone is not entitled to
a judgment against them on the agreement since he
performed the services of a real estate broker in
California, but was not licensed as a broker in
California.
They maintain that his recovery is
barred under the provisions of section 10136 of
the Business and Professions Code and related sections.
Numerous cases have held that one who simply finds
and introduces two parties to a real estate transaction need not be licensed as a real estate broker.
Such an intermediary or middleman is protected by
the finder's exception to the real estate licensing
laws, an exception first established in Shaffer v.
Beinhorn (1923) 190 Cal. 569, 573-574, 213 P. 960.
In that case, this court held that a person who
contracted to introduce a seller to a prospective
purchaser did not act as a broker but as a finder.
Many subsequent cases have recognized the excepti~.
(See, e.g., Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal.2d 662, 669
68 Cal.Rptr. 589, 441 P.2d 101; Davis v. Chipman,
210 Cal. 609 619-620, 293 P. 40; Zappas v. King Williams
Press, Inc., 10 Cal.App.3d 768, 772-773, 89 Cal.Rptr,
307; Hasckian v. Krotz, 268 Cal.App.2d 311, 319324, 74 Cal.Rptr. 410; Porter v. Cirod, Inc., 242
Cal.App.2d 761, 762-763, 51 Cal.Rptr. 784; Evans v.
Riverside Internat. Raceway, 237 Cal.App.2d 666,
675-677, 47 Cal.Rptr. 187; Spielberg v. Granz, 185
Cal.App.2d 283, 290-291, 8 Cal.Rptr. 190; Palmer v.
Wahler, 133 Cal.App.2d 705, 708-711, 285 P.2d 8;
Freeman v. Jergins, 125 Cal.App.2d 536, 546-551,
271 P.2d 210; Crofoot v. Spivak, 113 Cal.App.2d 146,
147-148, 248 P.2d 45; Rhode v. Bartholomew, 94 Cal.App.2d 272, 279-282, 210 P.2d 768.)
The finder is a person whose employment is limited
to bringing the parties together so that they may
negotiate their own contract, and the distinction
between the finder and the broker frequently turns
upon whether the intermediary has been invested wiili
authority to participate in negotiations.
(See, e.g.,
Batson v. Strehlow, supra, 68 Cal.2d 662, 669, 68 Cal.·
Rptr. 589, 441 P. 2d 1001; Davis v. Chipman, supra, 2H
Cal.609, 619-620, 293 P.40.) . . .
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One who merely introduces two parties to a real
estate transaction, whether or not he solicits those
persons, does not need to be as knowledgeable about
real estate transactions as a licensed broker, unless, of course, he participates in the negotiations
Unless he enters into the negotiation of
the transaction or other activities beyond introduction, he need not be well versed in real estate law
or in real estate economics and appraising.
It is true that the finder's exception presents
a seeming anomaly in our law.
In general, an unlicensed individual may recover an agreed compensation
where he merely finds a buyer, seller, lender, or
borrower, but if in addition to finding such person
he goes further and helps to conclude the transaction by taking part in negotiating the details of
the transaction, compromising or composing differences between the parties, by way of example, he may
not recover the agreed compensation.
Nevertheless, when viewed in the light of the
competing public policies the finder's exception
is not anomalous. Fundamental to our law is the
basic principle that persons should perform their
contracts, and when they breach their agreements,
action should ordinarily lie to enforce contractual
duties.
On the other hand, the promotion of competency and integrity in those called upon by the public to perform complex duties involving trust is a
salutary purpose, and the policy underlying the licensing statutes must be given full effect. Neither
considerations of competency nor of trust are of
importance where the undertaking is merely to seek
out, locate, find and introduce a buyer, seller,
borrov:er, or lender to his counterpart or where
negotiations and completion of the transaction are
left corapletely to the principals. By enforcing
the promise to pay a finder's fee we give effect to
the policy of enforcement of contracts in cases
where the policy underlying the licensing statute
does not directly apply.
It is for the Legislature,
not this court, to determine whether the finder's
exception should be terminated.
Tyrone v. Kelley, supra, at 69-70 and 72.
The California court's approach to the broker-finder issue
is dn ~nlighlened one which recognizes and preserves the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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important differences between the two and prevents those Who
bargain for and receive valuable finder's services from
avoiding just payment for the same.

CONCLUSION

The mere finding and introduction of a buyer is not an
activity or dealing which results in legal liabilities between the buyer and seller of realty and thus does not involve the dangers sought to be protected against by the Utah
Real Estate Brokers Act; therefore, public policy does not
ord~

require that appellant as a finder only be licensed in

to recover a commission in good faith contracted for, honestly
earned and not otherwise disputed.

The Act should not be reaa

to include such activity or dealing, nor require such

lie~~

ing.
DATED this

/,,t--1

day of December, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS & CROWTHER

B

~~4ztdf~

~~11.

CROWTHER

By&J~·
DAVID L.

S'l'OTT
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